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Abstract: Michèle Le Dœuff considers the relationship between Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir as a 
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of women's oppression in particular. The latter is especially strange since Sartre used strongly sexist metaphors 
and adopted a macho attitude towards women. In her book Hipparchia's Choice, Le Dœuff speaks in this context of 
"theoretical masculinism." She convincingly shows in this book that Sartre without using images could not have closed 
his existentialist philosophy: without the feminine drawback he would not have been able to explain why man cannot 
become god. Sartre not only understands gaining knowledge as a rape of a woman he also fears that the possessed 
feminine (body) could reverse its position from being dominated to the dominating force by appropriating the masculine 
through slime. In Being and Nothingness Sartre states that "slime is the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly–sweet, feminine 
revenge." Despite of the fact that De Beauvoir used Sartre's heterosexist ontology and metaphysics she managed to 
provide a highly influential depiction of women's condition and offered an original approach to the understanding of 
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(1995) that de Beauvoir rejected "efforts by feminist 
philosophers to define her position as philosophically 
distinct from Sartre's."2 This is perhaps a result of both, 
the years of contemptuous dismissal by philosophers 
and her affection for Sartre. De Beauvoir and Sartre 
read and criticized the writings of each other. They had 
a symbiotic relationship. In Simone De Beauvoir: A Life, 
A Love Story, Claude Francis and Fernande Gontier 
2 Margaret A. Simons, "Introduction," in The Philosophy 
of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical Essays, ed. Margaret A. 
Simons, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 
2006, pp. 1-10, here p. 1.
As is well known, de Beauvoir got insulted with 
such labels as "Notre-Dame de Sartre" or "La Grande 
Sartreuse."1 Like le Dœuff, Toril Moi notices in Simone 
de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman that 
whilst de Beauvoir referred to Sartre as a philosopher, 
she classified herself as a writer and novelist. Margaret 
Simons states in the "Introduction" to the collection of 
critical essays entitled The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir 
1 Toril Moi, "Politics and the Intellectual Woman: Clichés 
in the Reception of Simone de Beauvoir's Work," in 
Feminist Theory & Simone de Beauvoir, Oxford, GB: 
Blackwell 1990. pp. 21-60, here p. 21.
58 Ruth A. Burch
http://www.existenz.us Volume 11, No. 1, Spring 2016
of philosophy in terms of "a permanent effort towards 
reactualization" (PI 204-5). Yet this "reorientation never 
means absolute discontinuity" (PI 204). For both de 
Beauvoir and Le Dœuff, being a philosopher and being 
a feminist coincide.
In her essay "Women and Creativity," de Beauvoir 
writes that "truly great works are those which contest the 
world in its entirety."8 Her passionate, forceful and ironic 
voice in The Second Sex certainly meets this criterion for 
genius and exemplifies the fact that women are not 
creative inferiors to men. In The Second Sex, a classic of 
both philosophy and of women's liberation movement, 
De Beauvoir wants to know "what is a woman?"9 She 
investigated women's situation because she made the 
experience in life that while men are primarily perceived 
and conceived as human beings and, thus, are supposed 
to have direct access to the world in its objectivity, 
women are primarily perceived and conceived as sexed 
creatures with a distorted and partial understanding of 
the world. She writes that whilst male men thought of 
themselves as being "inevitable, like a pure idea, the 
One, the All, the Absolute Spirit," women's bodies were 
philosophically and socio-culturally constructed in 
such a way that they are "weighed down by everything 
peculiar to it" (SS 16). De Beauvoir maintains that the 
dictates for femininity, which women internalized, can 
be undone because as she says in the first sentence of 
the second book of The Second Sex "one is not born, 
but rather becomes, a woman" (SS 295) (on ne naît pas 
femme: on le devient). Humans are capable of constantly 
transcending and surpassing their biological givens 
such as sex difference since, for her, "in the human 
species individual 'possibilities' depend upon the 
economic and social situation" (SS 67). The philosopher 
and historian of science Donna Haraway states that 
"despite important differences, all the modern feminist 
meanings of gender have roots in Simone de Beauvoir's 
claim that 'one is not born a woman'."10
Like De Beauvoir, Le Dœuff is a highly original 
[Henceforth cited as PI]
8 Simone DeBeauvoir, "Women and Creativity," in French 
Feminist Thought: A Reader, ed. Toril Moi, Oxford, GB: 
Blackwell 1966, pp. 17-32, here p. 28.
9 Simone DeBeauvoir, The Second Sex, transl. Howard 
M. Parshley, London, GB: Vintage, 1949/1953, p. 15. 
[Henceforth cited as SS]
10 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature, London, GB: Free Association 
Books 1991, p. 131.
cite Sartre's acknowledgement of his emotional and 
intellectual dependency on de Beauvoir: "in a certain 
way, if you like, I owe her everything...I put complete 
trust in her....You could say that I write for her."3 Francis 
and Gontier suggest, "their [writing] efforts united 
them more surely than an embrace" (LL 168). Yet de 
Beauvoir is not Sartre's equal in a harmonious mutual 
relationship, but it rather holds true what Moi says, "the 
two may well be one, but he is the one they are."4
This essay revisits Simone de Beauvoir's 
masterpiece Le Deuxième Sexe / The Second Sex 
(1953) with the aid of Michèle Le Dœuff's analysis 
of pictorial or imaginary elements in philosophical 
texts. Although my focus is on the early texts by Le 
Dœuff, her intellectual encounters with de Beauvoir 
are still ongoing.5 In her research Le Dœuff takes a 
central interest in the imaginaire.6 In The Philosophical 
Imaginary (1980) she identifies throughout the history of 
philosophy images that were presented by their authors 
as merely ornamental, marginal additions and an aid for 
understanding, when in fact, they are essential in a strain 
of argumentation or in an entire philosophical system. 
She says about her method, "it involves reflecting on 
strands of the imaginary operating in places where, 
in principle, they are supposed not to belong and 
yet where, without them, nothing would have been 
accomplished."7 Le Dœuff understands doing history 
3 Claude Francis and Fernande Gontier, Simone De 
Beauvoir: A Life, a Love Story, transl. Lisa Nesselson, 
New York, NY: St. Martin's Press 1985, p. 111. 
[Henceforth cited as LL]
4 Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual 
Woman, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1994, p. 222.
5 For instance, in 2006 she published the essay "Engaging 
with Simone de Beauvoir". And at the 7th annual 
conference of the Society for European Philosophy 
(SEP), which took place in September 2011 at York St. 
John University in England, Le Dœuff was a keynote 
speaker. At this conference I chaired the panel session 
on "Philosophy and 'Women in the Profession'" with 
Pamela Sue Anderson and Roxana Baiasu on it and 
Le Dœuff herself was as an active discussant in the 
audience.
6 Raoul Mortley, "Chapter 5. Michèle Le Dœuff," in 
French Philosophers in Conversation: Levinas, Schneider, 
Serres, Irigaray, Le Dœuff, Derrida, ed. Raoul Mortley, 
London, GB: Routledge 1991, pp. 80-91, here p. 85. 
[Henceforth cited as MD]
7 Michèle Le Dœuff, The Philosophical Imaginary, transl. 
Colin Gordon, London, GB: Athlone Press, 1989, p. 2. 
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and obstinately self-willed French philosopher who 
encourages women to develop their own voice and 
agency. She does not want to be counted as belonging to 
a certain school of thinking because she perspicaciously 
sees therein a version of the trap for women philosophers 
to have in philosophy a permissive status only. She 
claims, "permissiveness is a sly form of prohibition" (PI 
103). In several of her works, she evidences that women 
are welcome in philosophy exclusively in subordinated 
roles for example as disciples, commentators, or lovers 
of male master-philosophers. She argues that women are 
used in philosophy in two ways: (1) they have to console 
and reassure the male philosophers to be superior and 
in possession of plenitude despite their experience of 
lack, disappointment, and incompleteness and (2) on 
the level of language they are the atrophied, disvalued, 
excluded other.11 Le Dœuff regards "femininity" as "a 
fantasy product of conflicts within a field of reason that 
has been assimilated to masculinity" (WP 196, see MD 
85-6). She maintains that "it is probably always the same 
when anti-feminist men talk about women: they project 
their desires and anxieties, and attempt to pass off this 
discourse of desire and defense as a rational theoretical 
discourse" (WP 197). On feminist philosophers' 
speaking position, Le Dœuff writes,
not from that other position produced by philosophy 
as a preserve of purely negative otherness. Nor from 
within metaphysics since this founds the duality of 
masculine-rationality and feminine disorder. But 
there are other possibilities. For logocentrism is not 
the ineluctable presupposition (or hypothesis) of any 
rational position. [WP 198]
With other words, for Le Dœuff, it is possible to reason 
whilst avoiding or escaping both logocentrism and its 
others against which it has constituted itself and which 
are defined by it.
Sabina Lovibond who defends rationality along 
the lines of Le Dœuff, is in agreement with Le Dœuff 
that reason itself is not contaminated by patriarchy.12 Le 
Dœuff is working toward transforming the relationship 
of the subject to philosophical research. She suggests 
to move away from desiring individual intellectual 
11 Michèle Le Dœuff, "Women and Philosophy," in French 
Feminist Thought: A Reader, ed. Toril Moi, Oxford, 
GB: Blackwell 1987, pp. 181-209, here pp. 188, 192. 
[Henceforth cited as WP]
12 Sabina Lovibond, "Feminism and the 'Crisis of 
Rationality'," New Left Review I/207 (September/
October 1994), 72-86.
mastery in philosophy and, instead, to start turning 
doing philosophy into a collective undertaking (PI 207). 
She sees in the seventeenth century French philosopher 
Blaise Pascal a paradigm or model for her idea of 
agreeing to be "a tributary to a collective discourse 
and knowledge" (PI 208) which is of an incomplete 
and open nature. She considers his Pensées or 
"thoughts", published in 1670, which are a collection of 
philosophical fragments assembled with the objective 
of an impassionate defense of the Christian faith against 
Montague's skepticism and Epictetus' stoicism, as an 
example which should be followed because it is "a 
form of writing which does not claim to reconstruct 
and explain everything, which slides along the verge 
of the unthought, develops only by grafting itself onto 
another discourse and is consenting to be its tributary" 
(WP 208). By means of this "plural work" and the 
ensuing plural meanings, Le Dœuff claims that women 
can be included into philosophizing. This reintegration 
of women into meandering thought with its blanks and 
gaps includes also a change in the "psycho-theoretical 
attitude" (WP 208).
Le Dœuff is both a Universalist and an anti-
foundationalist.13 She uses psychoanalytic and 
postmodern ideas in order to interrogate the desire 
for and the will to truth. She maintains that what 
is needed is "a form of philosophy that no longer 
considers its incompleteness a tragedy” but that, rather, 
is distinguished by "a recognition of the necessarily 
incomplete character of all theorization" and that 
countenances the shifting, wandering nature of thought 
(WP 207-8). Totalizing efforts cannot but violate the 
excluded groups such as women or children. In her 
view, traditional philosophy simultaneously creates 
and represses femininity:
[T]oday it is possible to think of rationality otherwise 
than in a hegemonic mode....This struggle was 
begun by historical materialism, in so far as this 
is a rationalism which renounces the idea of the 
omnipotence of knowledge. From here on one can 
trace a new form of philosophy, as a fellow-traveler 
of conflicts which arise outside its realm and which, 
similarly, will be resolved (if at all) outside it, by means 
which do not rely on its inherent power. [WP 198]
Although Le Dœuff regards critically analyzing the 
philosophical imaginary as indispensable for doing 
philosophy differently, she always insists that it is even 
13 Colin Gordon in "Translator's Note" to PI viii, PI 171 
n4, see MD 87.
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gemacht).15 Le Dœuff agrees to a certain extent with 
Nietzsche insofar as, for her, images in a sense are
the foundation of this or that system or way of 
reasoning; they organize the fundamental values of 
every system...and they express the differences the 
philosopher has to assume before getting started on his 
work. [MD 87]
She states that in order to identify misogynistic sub-
texts in philosophical texts a distanced way of reading 
is needed "which enables one to see what is implicit in 
the text or to pick out the 'gaps' in a theorization" (WP 
205).
In the "Preface" to Hipparchia's Choice Le Dœuff 
poses her research question, how in an environment of 
sexism which
underpins the very method by which a system of 
thought is established...can we conceive of a method 
for a feminist philosophy, or for a philosophy which 
will allow men and women to come together in a 
common task? [HC xii]
Her work aims at creating "a non-hegemonic 
rationalism" which accepts its "intrinsic incompleteness" 
(HC 206). In this way she attempts to redraw the 
borders of philosophy in a way that leaves no space 
for sexist and other exclusions by means of irrational 
and uncritical imagery. In her philosophy women and 
children are theoretically as capable as male men are. In 
it reason and imagination exist only in the plural (PI 5). 
This means that she is interested in, as she puts it, "the 
variety of forms of rationality" (MD 85). She explains 
that traditional "philosophical discourse is inscribed 
and declares its status as philosophy through a break 
with myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the image" 
(PI 1). In contrast to it, her point of departure is that 
the imaginary not only "occupies the place of theory's 
impossible" (PI 5), but that reverie is also to be found 
within objective knowledge itself. She regards the 
philosophical imaginary as a cultural product. From 
Bachelard's poetics she learned that images have close 
ties with affectivity (PI 6). This is one source of their 
powerful effects.
Unlike de Beauvoir who at best marginally relies on 
psychoanalytic insights, Le Dœuff uses psychoanalytic 
language quite generously. For instance, she employs 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 
Bänden: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari, Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter 1967 onward, 
Notes Vol. 10, Winter 1883-4, pp. 658, 654.
more important that thought systems have to be applied 
to concrete problems of the social world. Her materialist 
feminism is concerned with phallocratic prejudices. 
Le Dœuff understands by the "phallocratic point of 
view" "the ideological justification of the exclusion of 
women from valorized social fields, and the project of 
maintaining in existence all forms of social domination 
and inferiorization of women" (PI 187 n39).
In the 2006 "Epilogue" of her reprinted book 
Hipparchia’s Choice (1989) Le Dœuff argues that
the field currently known as "philosophy" must take 
into account its own potentialities, all of them, and 
at the most refined level, if it is to get rid of what 
shackles it both to social forms of exclusion and to a 
certain imaginary which ensures, within philosophical 
texts themselves, that no opening, no real freedom of 
thought, will ever be envisaged by the reader.14
In order to re-conceive philosophy in the Le Dœuffian 
mode, comparative knowledge of the whole history 
of philosophy is indispensable since both doing 
philosophy and doing philosophy of history are 
philosophical activities that cross-fertilize each other. 
For Le Dœuff, philosophy neither begins nor ends, 
but rather it is in a Deleuzian manner "impulse and 
movement"; it is an ever shifting thinking in and 
between the different intellectual disciplines (HC 168). 
This understanding of philosophy precludes putting 
women under tutelage of a totalized philosophical 
knowledge.
Her philosophical activities share an affinity with 
the "feminism of equality" which developed out of de 
Beauvoir's work and which opposes the "feminism 
of difference" that draws on Luce Irigaray's approach 
of "writing the feminine." She also found inspiration 
in the works of the Enlightenment philosophers, 
Bachelard (PI 2, 6), Koyré, Foucault (PI 7) and, as I have 
already mentioned, in Deleuze and Blaise Pascal. Her 
fragmented writing style and the ironic tone of her 
notebooks, which she collected in Hipparchia's Choice, 
draws on Nietzsche's "gay science" (HC 317). Similar to 
Le Dœuff, Nietzsche claimed that we think in images. 
He goes so far as to identify thought with images 
and claims that humans generated intelligibility via 
imagery: "we ourselves made the world thinkable by 
means of little images" (die Welt in Bildchen uns denkbar 
14 Michèle Le Dœuff, Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay 
Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc. (1989), transl. Trista 
Selous, Oxford, GB: Blackwell 2006, p. 317 [Henceforth 
cited as HC]
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the notion of transference, which is usually understood 
as referring to the "process of actualization of 
unconscious wishes."16 For instance, in a philosophical 
love transference relationship a male philosopher 
projects his own unconscious wish for phallic plenitude 
and completion on his female student who responds 
to his authoritarian display of philosophical mastery 
with an exclusive love of the philosopher's system and 
stops thinking for herself.17 The challenge for feminists 
consists in resisting and subverting such transferential 
demands for male narcissistic satisfaction and instead 
insisting on "conceptual self-determination" (HC 199). 
Only if women establish and keep a direct access to 
philosophy are intellectual independence and original 
philosophical contributions possible. Le Dœuff claims 
that both men and women need to experience lack, 
frustration, and disappointment in order to be able to 
be philosophically creative and productive.
At the end of the first volume of de Beauvoir's 
autobiography we read that Sartre said when he told 
de Beauvoir she had passed the agrégation: "from 
now on, I'm going to take you under my wing."18 Le 
Dœuff considers the Sartre-de Beauvoir relationship 
as a paradigmatic case of what she calls an "erotico-
theoretical transference" (WP 185) relationship: de 
Beauvoir devoted herself to Sartre theoretically by 
adopting his existentialist perspective for the analysis 
of reality in general and the analysis of women's 
oppression in particular. The latter is especially strange 
since Sartre used strongly sexist metaphors and adopted 
a macho attitude towards women. Le Dœuff speaks in 
this context of "theoretical masculinism" (HC 78). She 
convincingly shows that Sartre without using images 
could not have closed his existentialist philosophy: 
without the feminine drawback he would not have 
been able to explain why man cannot become god.
16 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, The 
Language of Psychoanalysis, transl. Donald Nicholson-
Smith, New York, NY: Norton, 1967/1973, p. 455.
17 A similar analysis of the love transference relationship 
between a man and a woman with regard to authority 
and knowledge is made by Shoshana Felman, Jacques 
Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in 
Contemporary Culture, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987.
18 Simone DeBeauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, 
transl. James Kirkup, Harmondsworth, GB: Penguin, 
1958/1959, p. 339; see Michèle Le Dœuff "Long Hair, 
Short Ideas," in PI, pp. 100-28, here p. 119.
Next, I give an account of Sartre's use of metaphors 
to make important philosophical points and, as Le 
Dœuff traces it, to efface contradictions and tensions 
in his thinking system. Like Nietzsche, in Being and 
Nothingness (1943) Sartre understands knowing in 
terms of appropriation and rape. He explains,
the scientist is the hunter who surprises a white nudity 
and who violates by looking at it....Knowledge is at 
one and the same time a penetration and a superficial 
caress...the desire to know is...appropriation.19
He not only understands gaining knowledge as a rape 
of a woman he also fears that the possessed feminine 
(body) could reverse its position from being dominated 
to the dominating force by appropriating the masculine 
through "slime."20 Sartre states,
there exists a poisonous possession; there is a 
possibility that the In–itself might absorb the 
For–itself...and that in this new being the In–itself 
would draw the For–itself into its contingency, into 
its indifferent exteriority, into its foundationless 
existence....Slime is the revenge of the In–itself. A 
sickly-sweet, feminine revenge. [BN 609]
Through this move Sartre links the In–itself and the 
immanent with the feminine and the For–itself and the 
transcendent with the masculine.21 He describes the 
works of the slimy as "a soft, yielding action, a moist 
and feminine sucking" (BN 609). Simons correctly states 
disgust in Sartre's descriptions of the female body (PB 9).
Sartre does not only want to lead a slime-free 
existence, he also hunts for plenitude, namely "the 
spherical plenitude of Parmenidean being" (BN 613). 
Sartre writes, "a good part of our life is passed in 
plugging up holes, in filling empty places, in realizing 
19 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay 
on Phenomenological Ontology, transl. Hazel Barnes, 
London, GB: Routledge, 1943/1958, pp. 578-80. 
[Henceforth cited as BN]
20 Collins and Peirce judge Sartre's sexism to be blatant 
due to its open and unashamed nature. See Marjorie 
Collins and Christine Peirce, "Holes and Slime: Sexism 
in Sartre's Psychoanalysis," in Women and Philosophy: 
Toward a Theory of Liberation, ed. Carol Gould and 
Marx Wartofsky, New York, NY: Capricorn Books 
1976, pp. 112-27.
21 The connection between Sartre's For-itself and the 
masculine is discussed in William Barrett, Irrational 
Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, New York, NY: 
Doubleday, 1958.
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and symbolically establishing a plenitude" (BN 613). In 
his view, one sort of hole is the feminine sex. He regards 
it as being indecent, offensive, and disgusting and 
maintains,
the obscenity of the feminine sex is that of everything 
which "gapes open." It is an appeal to being as all 
holes are. In herself woman appeals to a strange flesh 
which is to transform her into a fullness of being by 
penetration and dissolution. [BN 613-4]
But as already mentioned, the inviting female holes are 
also dangerous. Sartre writes: "beyond any doubt her 
sex is a mouth and a voracious mouth which devours 
the penis" (BN 614). A woman must hate herself and 
her sex strongly in order to be able to stand Sartre's 
depictions in what Le Dœuff adequately calls his 
"ontological-carnal hierarchy of 'the masculine' and 'the 
feminine'."22 Le Dœuff perspicuously criticizes Sartre's 
phenomenology of sexuality for founding
an ontological hierarchy, on the basis of which, for all 
eternity, woman can be posited as the in-itself and man 
as the for-itself. The masculine/feminine roles deduced 
from this phenomenology place woman outside the 
subject. [BE 282]
Despite the fact that de Beauvoir used Sartre's 
heterosexist ontology and metaphysics she managed 
to provide a highly influential depiction of women's 
condition and offered an original approach to the 
understanding of selfhood that places woman inside 
the subject. In BE, Le Dœuff analyses how de Beauvoir 
manages to bring about this transformation of the 
Sartrean existentialist framework with its women-
22 Michèle Le Dœuff, "Simone de Beauvoir and 
Existentialism," Feminist Studies 6/2 (Summer 1980), 
277-289, here p. 280. [Henceforth cited as BE]
excluding phantasmagoria. In Sartre's voluntaristic 
ethics external oppression does not exist; if there is 
oppression then it is always internal self-oppression of 
the subject which is not pursuing a project that has the 
aim of continuously transcending itself. It is not willing 
its freedom and, thus, lives in a state of bad faith. The 
constructive side of de Beauvoir's adoption of the 
Sartrean ethics of authenticity was that it allowed her 
to distance herself sufficiently from women's condition 
in order to expose its radical contingency. The essence 
of the human is the sum of human acts. The deeds, the 
doing is decisive for de Beauvoir's self rather than its 
essence.
In Sartre, the self and the other stand in an 
antagonistic relationship: each consciousness desires to 
bring about the death of the consciousness of the other. 
In contrast to Sartre, who sees the individual as solitary, 
abandoned in a senseless world, and exposed to the 
threat that the hostility of the other's consciousness 
will make him or her through its look a mere object, 
de Beauvoir emphasizes that human beings depend 
on each other. We are with others; we take part in the 
human Mitsein. The last words of the introduction to 
the French original of the Second Sex read: women aspire 
to partake at the human being with others (elles [les 
femmes] prétendent participer au mitsein humain). In Being 
and Time (1927), Heidegger developed the concept of 
"being with" (Mitsein) which denotes our being together 
with one another in the world.23 Since the existence of 
others is vital to oneself, it stands to reason to recognize 
one another and build social realities that liberate from 
oppression.
23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. John 
Macquarri and Edward Robinson, Oxford, GB: 
Blackwell, 1927/1962, p. 7.
